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SEEKING ".... THE FACES OF
OTHERNESS .. ."': A RESPONSE TO

PROFESSORS SARAT, FELSTINER, AND CAHN
Lucie E. Whitet
This comment addresses Naomi Cahn's The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standardin Theory and in Practice,2 and
William Felstiner and Austin Sarat's Enactments of Power: Negotiating
Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions.3 I will begin with
a recollection about my own education. I will then turn to "metatheory," or, more simply, the images we use to frame our thinking
about the social world. 4 I conclude with a brief story from my current work.
I
THE RECOLLECTION

When I went to college, our intellectual gurus-in addition to
Timothy Leary and John Lennon-were people like Noam Chomsky
and Claude Levi-Strauss. Their theories talked about boxes, bipolar oppositions, exchanges (usually of women, it seemed), and
law-ruled transformations. 5 Their intellectual maps were geometric
and symmetrical, and covered the entire social world, as we then
imagined it. Although there was a lot of movement within their paradigms, that movement resembled a military drill more than a
1 SeeJacques Derrida, Force de Loi: Le "Fondement Mystique de l'Authorite"/Forceof Law:
The "Mystical Foundationof Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans.,

1990) [hereinafter Derrida, Force of Law].
t B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D. Harvard Law School.
2
See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992).

3 See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality
and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992).
4
It is difficult to discuss "meta-theory" without losing touch with solid ground.
There is a parallel risk, however, in failing to interrogate the assumptions that frame our
understandings of the world. See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1410 n.64 (citing Nancy Fraser
and Linda Nicholson's discussion of "quasi-metanarratives" in Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism, 19, 27, in FEMINIsM/PosTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990)).
5 See, e.g., CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUss, THE SAVAGE MIND (G. Weidenfeld & Nicholson
Ltd. trans., 1966); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (ClaireJacobson
& Brooke Grundfest Schoepf trans., 1963); NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES
(1957); NOAM CHOMSKY, Topics IN THE THEORY OF GENERATIVE GRAMMAR (1966); NOAM
CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND

(1968).

1499

1500

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1499

dance. Those days, the late 1960s, were the salad days of what we
now disparagingly call "structuralism."
I remember reading during those years an essay by a young anthropologist named Clifford Geertz. 6 This essay used the technocratic talk of the times, but its message was out of synch with the
positivism that such talk often assumed. The essay made reference
'7
to a new "meta-concept" that Geertz called "terminal screens."
This term is a wonderful reminder of how the words we use are inevitably colored by the historical moment in which we write. Clifford
Geertz does not talk about "terminal screens" any more. Instead,
he writes about "thick descriptions,"" and works and lives. 9
By "terminal screens," Geertz meant something similar to what
one might describe, in the lingo of the 1990s, by reference to the
array of designer "shades" that one can buy in places like Los Angeles, to color the world different tints for one's varying moods.1 0
Geertz used "terminal screens" to point out that one can view the
same social "reality" through a range of different conceptual or theoretical screens or filters. Depending on the screen one looks
through-the matrix of terms or concepts through which one filters
what one sees-the same event can take on many different
appearances.
In the days when structuralism was still in vogue, this was a
marginal, though by no means novel, idea. Since then, it has entered the intellectual mainstream. Many people now talk of the partiality-or inevitably interpretive nature-of all of the
"discourses,"' ",paradigms," 2 or "lenses" through which we make
sense of our human world, and in turn constitute ourselves. Many
scholars now teach us how our understandings of the world both
reflect and define the positions from which we view it."s
6

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Person, Time and Conduct in Bali (Yale Southeast Asia Program,

Cultural Report Series No. 14, 1966), in

THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES

360 (1973).

ProfessorJames Boyd White points out that the concept of"terminological screens" was

first introduced into the discourses of social criticism by Kenneth Burke.
7

See GEERTZ, supra note 6.

8

See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in

THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 6, at 3. Naomi Cahn reports that Geertz

borrowed this term from Gilbert Ryle. See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1430 n.141.
9
See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR
(1988).
10 I have heard Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw, for example, use such an image in
several informal presentations to Los Angeles audiences.
11
See, e.g., Michel Foucault, History of Systems of Thought, in LANGUAGE, CouNTERMEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 199 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., &
Sherry Simon trans., 1977).
12

13

See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
For particularly compelling elaborations on this insight, see RENATO ROSALDO,

CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS

(1989);

ELIZABETH U. SPELMAN,
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II
META-THEORY

At the same time that Clifford Geertz's star was rising in the
world of social theory, Noam Chomsky's was falling: structuralism
was overtaken by new "post-structuralist" ways of thinking. The intellectual leader of this movement was Michel Foucault. Foucault,
with a little posthumous coaching from Nietzsche, was indisputably
a genius, a paradigm smasher. He, more than any other single figure, moved us beyond the "conventional," structural understanding
of power that Professors Sarat and Felstiner describe in their essay.
In this conventional view, power is a thing that people have and
wield over others, usually on the basis of their roles in stable institutional hierarchies. Foucault gave us a new meta-theory of powerone that was so intriguing, so fitting for the uncertain times of the
1970s, that many other theorists-sociologists, linguists, and historians-took up the joint project of filling in its details, and of using it, lens-like, to sharpen their view of social life.
According to this new meta-theory, power is not a tool. Rather,
like an evanescent fluid, it takes unpredictable shapes as it flows into
the most subtle spaces in our interpersonal world. In this picture,
we no longer see distinct "persons" controlling power's flow. Indeed, we cannot really separate the agents of the movement from
the movement itself. Sometimes we may think we see more or less
familiar human actors, who seem to guide the fluid, like children
might make giant soap bubbles in a park. Yet at other moments,
these familiar "persons" disappear, and we see only the patterns
that linger as the bubbles dance.
Power is lyrically described in Professors Felstiner and Sarat's
essay. It is "mobile and volatile, and it circulates ... it is a complicated resource that is constructed and reconstructed so that its pos14 It
session is neither necessarily obvious nor rigidly determined."'
is "continually enacted and re-enacted, constituted and re-constituted ... shaped and reshaped ... taken and lost ... present and
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988). If there is

currently a serious debate about this notion, it is not about whether each of us sees the
world from behind a particular, contingent "terminal screen." Rather, the debate is
about whether we have any power to shape the screens through which we see, or to shift
between them-either by authoring our own moral, political, or intellectual identities, or
by expanding the language that we use-or whether our perspectives on the world are
dictated by matters of fate, be they our genes, our life fortunes, the circuits wired into
our brains, or the categories inscribed into our native tongues. For a short but elegant
exploration of some of these themes, see Maria Lugones, Playfulness, World-Travelling and
Loving Perception, 2 HYPATIA 3 (1987).

14 Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 3, passim (quotes are in an original draft, on file with
author).
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absent.., shifting, deeply embedded in complex processes of contestation and negotiation."' 15
This theory of power offers a very interesting lens through
which to view social interactions, including interactions between
lawyers and their clients. Professors Felstiner and Sarat demonstrate this. Their picture of power works like one of those infrared
periscopes that military tank crews might use to render a desert
landscape visible in the dark. Through their lens, Professors Felstiner and Sarat are able to see and study, in astonishing topographical detail, the interactions of Wendy, a well-meaning but probably
lazy divorce lawyer, and Kitty, or rather Kathy, her excessively wellmannered client. Their lens enables Felstiner and Sarat to see in
the interactions of these two women subtle enactments of power
that other spectators, using a more conventional structural lens, for
instance, would miss.
Felstiner and Sarat's work is part of a larger collective project
undertaken by several legal scholars. Sally Merry, for instance, has
recently used Foucault's lens to produce a detailed account of how
working class people interact with the courts. 16 Regina Austin has
applied the lens to the workplace. 17 Others are producing similar
work.' 8 Of this new work, Gerald L6pez's writings stand out. He
uses the new conception of power to make visible complex interactions between groups of poor people and the professionals who try
to help them. 19 In this work, he shows how power is indeed very
fluid, even across the formidable barriers of race and class identity.
This new meta-theory of power is especially important to progressive law teachers, scholars, and advocates for at least two reasons. First, this lens is bringing forth a new body of situated microdescriptions of lawyering practice. For the first time, these descriptions give us a substantial base of data that we may use to reflect on
our work. This new data enables us to see exactly how and when we
deploy power within the routines of our own lawyering. With this
new insight into what we do, we can begin to ask why we do it and
how we might change. We can begin to envision different habits15
16

Id., passim (quotes are in an original draft, on file with author).
SALLY E. MERRY, GETrING JUSTICE AND GETrING EVEN: LEGAL

CONSCIOUSNESS

AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990).

17 See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988).
18 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2105 (1991).
19
See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRoGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven

Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. LJ. 1603 (1989); Gerald P. L6pez,
TrainingFuture Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated:Anti-Generic Legal
Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989) [hereinafter L6pez, Training Future Lawyers).
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different ways of talking and paying attention-that may make our
deployments of power less disruptive of our clients' efforts to empower themselves. This kind of reflective reconstruction of our dayto-day lawyering routines can make our practice, as progressive lawyers, more consistent with our aspirations of greater social justice. 20
Thus, the descriptive project undertaken by Felstiner and Sarat
makes possible a new field of critical reflection on advocacy and
pedagogy2 t-a "theoretics" of practice-the potential of which we
are just beginning to explore.
The second reason that Foucault's picture of power is so important to progressive advocates is that it has opened up new possibilities in the political practice of relatively disempowered groups. The
conventional theory of power reveals a dichotomized world of domination and subordination; through such a lens, the hegemony of the
dominant class is virtually absolute. Not only does that class confine
the actions of the subordinated, but it also dictates their language,
preferences, thoughts, dreams, and indeed most deeply held moral
and political intuitions. In American legal scholarship, Catharine
MacKinnon has used this dichotomized picture of power with great
skill to challenge claims that women can experience authentic sub22
jectivity in contemporary society.
MacKinnon posed this challenge in an encounter with Carol
Gilligan at Buffalo Law School in 1984.23 In that exchange, MacKinnon argued that values of "caring" and "connection" that Gilligan
and other feminists sought to reclaim and celebrate are symptoms of
women's subordinate position in a closed system of power. 24 According to MacKinnon, even women's feelings of sexual pleasure
are suspect; these feelings, like every other feature of Woman, de20 I use "we" because many legal scholars have expressed similar aspirations in
their writing and practice. A recent symposium issue of the Hastings Law Journalon the
Theoretics of Practice collects some of the most recent works to which I refer. See Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 717 (1992).
21
See Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1989);
L6pez, TrainingFuture Lawyers, supra note 19; Howard Lesnick, Being a Teacher, of Lawyers:

Discerningthe Theory of My Practice,43 HASTING LJ. 1095; Schon, Bridges to Where: What
Are Our Objectives, Keynote Address at Association of American Law Schools 1992
Annual Conference, Mini-Workshop on Theory and Practice: Finding Bridges for the
Classroom (Jan. 4, 1992) (available on audio cassette from the AALS, 1201 Conn. Ave.,
N.W., Washington, D.C.).
22

See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE A.

AND LAW

MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
23
See Ellen C. DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse,Moral

(1989).
Values, and the Law-a Conversa-

tion, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985) (transcript of a discussion held on October 19, 1984 at
the law school of the State University of New York at Buffalo as part of the James McCormick Mitchell Lecture Series).
24

Id. at 73-76.
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fine a colonized subject, a being whose essence has been shaped by
25
and for men.
Thus, as Angela Harris has demonstrated in her critique of
Catharine MacKinnon's work, 26 a conventional understanding of
power locks women, and indeed every subordinated group, in a discursive "prison-house" 2 7 from which there is no escape. Just as the
dominators can do nothing except wield their power, the
subordinated can speak nothing except their masters' will. No
change is possible in this universe; indeed, even the most creative
tactics of resistance or gestures of solidarity reinforce the bonds of
domination. This understanding of domination, designed to reveal
injustice, leads to two perverse results. First, it excuses those in the
dominant class from attempting to reflect on or change their own
conduct, or to ally themselves with subordinate groups. Second, it
reinforces in relatively disempowered groups the very doubts about
their feelings, capacities, and indeed human worth that subordination itself engenders.
Foucault's picture of power disrupts this closed circle of domination. By showing that the dominators do not "possess" power,
his picture makes possible a politics of resistance. It opens up space
for a self-directed, democratic politics among subordinated groups,
a politics that is neither vanguard-driven nor co-opted, as the politics of the colonized subject inevitably is. At the same time, and of
more immediate relevance to lawyers, this new picture of power
makes possible a self-reflective politics of alliance and collaboration
between professionals and subordinated groups. Given the new
theaters of political action that Foucault's theory of power has
opened up, it is not surprising that it has stolen the stage in historical, cultural, and finally legal studies from those who speak of power
in more conventional terms. The Foucaultian picture of power
makes insurgent politics interesting again; it brings possibility back
into focus, even in apparently quiescent times when resistance is visible only in the microdynamics of everyday life.
Yet with the power of this new lens comes a risk. With such an
instrument in our hands, it is easy to forget the lesson that Professor
Geertz taught. Any "terminal screen" gives us only a partial view of
the world: it enhances some features of reality-probably those that
25 These themes are developed throughout MacKinnon's writings. For one clear
early statement of the link between male domination and even "normal," ostensibly
noncoercive heterosexuality, see MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 22, at
46.
26 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 590-601 (1989).
27 The allusion is to FREDRICKJAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE: A CRrrICAL ACCOUNT OF STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM

(1972).
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its inventors most wanted to see-while erasing or obscuring others.
The risk for those who use Foucault's lens is that they will forget this
lesson, and begin to think of their own meta-theory as the last word
on how power "really" works-the terminal screen. Foucault's lens
reveals such a longed-for landscape of possibility that it has begun
to entrap our imagination, deluding us into thinking that with this
lens we have finally seized the power to comprehend the world.
One consequence inevitably follows when we forget that our
latest theories are not absolute. This is the risk that, in our own
certainty, we will lose patience with those who do not share our
faith. As Professor Delgado points out, such intolerance often
reveals itself only after time renders our certainties obsolete, and
thereby ridiculous. 28 At least two further risks are specific to Foucault's lens.
The first risk has been identified by feminist scholars such as
Nancy Fraser and Robin West. 29 While the Foucaultian lens reveals

the fluidity of power, it does not show how power can become congealed in social institutions in ways that sustain domination. It may
be true that everyday interactions create and maintain social institutions, but this insight does not enable us to map those interactions
against the institutional matrices they create. Nor does this insight
show us how institutions constrain the circulation of power, channeling it to flow toward some social groups and away from others.
In short, the Foucaultian lens does not move us toward a theoretics
and a reconstructive politics of institutionaldesign.
Without richer meta-theories-stronger lenses-that focus on
institutional as well as interpersonal realities, we will remain bewildered by exactly how our actions reiterate what has been called
"structural" or "institutional" subordination."0 We will remain unable to critique'and repattern our actions, so that we enact more
democratic institutions as we seek to live more ethical lives. These
other lenses need not replace Foucault's; rather, they can provide a
second filter on the same landscape, enabling us to study the geol28 Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992).
29

See NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CON-

TEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 17-34 (1989) [hereinafter FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES];
Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59; Nancy

Fraser, The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics (1989)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also BRYAN D. PALMER, DESCENT
INTO DISCOURSE: THE REIFICATION OF LANGUAGE AND THE WRITING OF SOCIAL HISTORY

(1990).
30
See, e.g., KimberlE W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformationand
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987).
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ogy of the ocean floor as well as the action of the waves. Without
these other lenses, the dynamics of systemic injustice-dynamics
that stunt the life-chances of some social groups with more than random frequency-will remain invisible and therefore go
unchallenged.
In divorce lawyering, Professors Felstiner and Sarat have studied an area in which systemic patterns of race and class privilege do
not always figure in obvious ways. Therefore, in that setting it may
be, as they suggest, that their theoretical framework does pick up
much of what is interesting to see. However, we cannot tell what
different lenses might show us until we try them out. The work of
Martha Fineman,3 1 for instance, suggests that theories about gender
and motherhood, as well as a Foucaultian theory of power, might
help us make sense of Felstiner and Sarat's story of the unsupported
wife.3 2 And in areas of legal practice where hierarchies of race and
class routinely figure, such as criminal law or social welfare law, the
risk that a Foucaultian lens will unduly limit our vision is great. In
those domains of practice, recurring patterns of domination will go
uncharted unless lawyer-client interactions are studied through a
3
lens that explicitly theorizes race and class. 3
Getting stuck inside the Foucaultian worldview carries a second
risk as well. In addition to stunting our ability to rethink institutions
in emancipatory ways, this lens obscures our human capacity-or,
more accurately, our longing-to realize ourselves in the world by
feeling with other people, as well as by winning against them. Foucault's lens defines and thereby reveals human interactions as strategic contests. Our personhood takes form in those moments when
the contest shifts power our way. This lens does not pick up those
moments when we feel the force of another's emotions or the resolve behind her commitments. If such moments appear at all, they
look like surges of the other's power rather than images of the
other's face.
We must not discount the risks imposed by theories that make
human connection seem too easy to attain. As Professor Cahn
points out, such theories are very dangerous in our not-yet-postcolonial world.3 4 Such theories have typically sanctioned domina31

See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REAL-

ITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).

32 Felstiner & Sarat, surpa note 3, at 1471.
33 See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 1989 YALE LJ. 1559; Isabelle
Gunning, Teaching Methods to Discuss Racial Stereotyping and Discrimination, Address at Association of American Law Schools Workshop on Clinical Legal Education
(May 3, 1991) (audiotape available from AALS).
34 See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1429 n.139; 1445 n.217; see also GAYATRI SPIVAK, THE
POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES (1990) [hereinafter SPIVAK,
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tion of the most insidious kind, by encouraging the privileged to
name the feelings of less powerful others, without cautioning that to
name another's feelings is also to silence her voice. 35 We cannot
give up Foucault's contest-focused theory to return to a simplistic,
imperialist version of humanism. At the same time, however, we
must recognize that Foucault's theory is ultimately-and indeed, inevitably-incomplete.3 6 For although Foucaultian power is always
in motion, it hovers outside of the other, circling in what is ultimately a closed field. Foucault's theory does not make sense of our
yearning for, or our occasional movement toward, a more fully and
freely interconnected human world.
What if we seek to map the elusive moments of human connection as well as the endless currents of contest? What if we seek to
transform our practice and the institutions that practice enacts, not
merely so we will be more adept at manipulating power, but also
more present when others call our names? If we want to reflect on
our longing for connection as well as our zeal for contest, what theoretical lenses might we use?
There is no easy answer to this question. Nonetheless, Renato
37
Rosaldo, in an arresting essay in his recent book Culture and Truth,
offers some promising thoughts. He describes his effort to comprehend, in order to "translate," the ritual of headhunting among the
Ilongot group in the Philippines. He studied the practice exhaustively, using the best methods academic ethnography had to offer.
After extensive conversation with local informants, he carefully
mapped out all of the features of the ritual. He then attempted to
interpret the practice-to translate its underlying cultural logic in
terms that would make sense to his own people. His informants had
explained that the ritual was their way of enacting the grief they felt
for loved ones who had died prematurely. Yet even with the benefit
of this explanation, Rosaldo could not fathom how the grotesque act
of beheading a member of a neighboring group and then eating his
flesh could be endorsed by any human beings as a sensible, let alone
THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC]; GAYATRI C. SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS (1987); ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER (T. Asad ed.,

1973).
35 This is the underlying paradox of "advocacy" for a less powerful other. See Lucie
E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradoxof Lawyeringforthe Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861
(1990). Advocacy is inescapably-etymologically-a practice of translation, of carrying

the voice of the other into a new domain. Id. at 861 n.3. Yet translation is also a re-

placement of the other's voice. Thus, Professor White appropriately raises the theme of
"tragedy" in his comment on Professor Cunningham's article. James B. White, Translation as a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388 (1992).
36
See FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES, supra note 29.
37
See ROSALDO, supra note 13.
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sacred, act. For all of Rosaldo's anticolonial commitment, he felt
38
that this practice came from a radically Other world.
It was only when Rosaldo witnessed his wife plunge down a
gorge to her death that he finally felt for himself the rage that follows the loss of a loved one before her time. It was the force of this
feeling that enabled him, for the first time, to imagine why the
Ilongot might have acted out their own grief in the way that they
did. When he recalled his informant's explanation in the context of
his own experience, he finally began to comprehend the ritual's
human sense.
Rosaldo does not fully elaborate a theory of empathy in his essay. Rather, he offers this story to suggest some themes on which
such a theory might draw. He suggests that the force of one's own
emotions may cast a moment's light on others' lives, revealing both
irreducible difference and, paradoxically, common ground. Contrary to Professor Cahn's suggestion in her essay,3 9 Rosaldo suggests that we need not know all of the "facts" about the other in
order for these moments to occur. Nor need we share all the features of the other's "identity," categorically defined. Indeed, as prerequisites for empathy, both of these conditions are impossible to
meet.
But there is also a deeper problem with the two conditions for
empathy that Professor Cahn's essay identifies. This deeper problem is that these two paths toward empathy are also practices of
domination. The advice that we must find out the "facts" of the
other to feel empathy toward her counsels us to objectify that person, to confine her subjectivity in categories that we construct. And
the idea that to feel empathy with the other person we must identify
with her, along such dimensions as race, parental status, and class,
dashes all hope of empathy in many settings. In those few circumstances where empathy remains possible, this view condones practices of perception and definition that "essentialize" the other,
naming her as more "like" us than she may wish to be. These practices of collecting facts about the other or cataloguing similarities
with her may indeed enable us to feel closer to the other person. At
the same time, however, such practices effect interpersonal domination. Perhaps we must take such steps, if we seek to understand the
other. But we must also renounce these practices, or at least our confidence that they can work, if we are to recognize the other as a fellow-unique-human being.

38

Cf

39

See Cahn, supra note 2, at 1429.

SPIVAK, THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC,

supra note 34.
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Thus, the practice of empathy is a paradox. It takes place beyond the fields of interpersonal contestation, beyond our obsession
to know exactly who we are and our maneuvers to name the other.
The practice of empathy takes place beyond our certainty that, in
listening to a battered woman who has fought back, that we, unlike
'40
her, "could never stab anyone."
III
A STORY
My present research involves the role of parents in two local
Head Start programs. 4 1 In doing this work, I have become acutely
aware of our need for multiple theoretical lenses, lenses that focus
on institutions, on moments of recognition, as well as on the ebbs
and flows of interpersonal power. I felt this need with a particular
urgency after conducting an interview with a seventy-two year old
former sharecropper in rural North Carolina. This woman was the
great-grandmother and legal guardian of a Head Start child. In the
interview, she gave me a brief account of the highlights of her life.
She told me of her father's defiance in sending his daughter to
school when the white plantation bosses expected her to be working
in the fields. She told of receiving a scholarship to an elite women's
college, but turning it down because she could not afford a bus
ticket to get there. She told of graduating from an AfricanAmerican teacher's college and of teaching for fifty years in the public schools. She told me what it was like to teach before the schools
were integrated, when her students were given text-books handed
down from whites. She also told me what it was like to teach after
integration, when white children asked, and were allowed, to transfer out of her class. She referred only in passing to the civil rights
movement. I learned from others that she had been one of the
movement's many local leaders in the rural counties of the south.
As I contemplated this story, comparing it to what others had
told me about the record of racial violence in the county and the
courage this woman had shown in combating it, two features stood
out. First, throughout the story, she expressed inexhaustible patience, and indeed love, for the white people she had dealt with over
the years. Second, although she recounted many injustices, her narrative carefully excluded the details of the violence she had en-

Id.
Head Start is a federally funded social program providing pre-school and other
services to poor families. See Head Start Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9858 (1991).
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dured. I had noted similar themes in interviews with other African42
American Head Start parents.
After the formal interview was completed and the tape recorder
turned off, I casually inquired about the woman's older greatgrandchild, who, like my own daughter, had recently started kindergarten. When I asked this question, my informant became visibly
sad. She told me that when she had dropped this child off at school
earlier that morning, a young white child had run up to take her
hand. Just as her great-granddaughter reached back, however, a
second white child came up to the first and yanked her hand away,
explaining that white girls should not touch people who were black.
Then the woman looked hard at me, and said, "The white people will go to any lengths to keep us down, even if it means keeping
themselves down as well. They're making Frankensteins of us all."
This encounter could be examined through a Foucaultian lens.
Such an examination would reveal an important reality. It would
reveal this woman's skillful maneuvers, designed to ensure that our
mutual reality was negotiated on her terms. This lens would show a
woman who was artful in controlling the pace and extent of her revelations, and in determining how the injuries she had suffered
would be named. This lens would reveal a woman negotiating the
power between us to shape an account that she wanted me to hear.
Yet this lens reveals only a partial reality. For when this woman
told me of her child's morning at school, she was not merely controlling how that event would be interpreted, and thereby trumping
my own power to do the same. She was also speaking to me as another person. Through her brief story, I "felt," for a moment,
something of the impossible sadness that eluded our language
game. At the same time, I picked up her astute reminder that as one
43
of those whites, I dare not claim to have "felt" her pain.
The risk of domination is inextricable from every humanist
practice. Yet we must still seek to listen when others speak to us,
42

SeeJUDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS (1985)

(documenting interactions between African-American maids and their white employers);
JAMES SCOTr, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990)

(describing ways in which systematically dominated groups conceal feelings and exper-

iences in interactions with members of dominating groups).
43 In thinking about the (im)possibility and practice of empathy, I am guided by
Jacques Derrida's reading of Emmanuel Levinas. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, Violence and
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas, in WRrrING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan
Bass trans., 1978); Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 1. In writing about justice, as distinguished from rule or law, Derrida seeks guidance from Levinas's "difficult" conception,
which is centered in the paradox of empathy. According to Derrida, Levinas imagined
justice as the "equitable honoring of faces ... the heteronomic relation to others, to the
faces of otherness that govern me, whose infinity I cannot thematize and whose hostage
I remain." Id. at 959.
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and to be moved. We must still seek to hear in the words of others
not just negotiations of power, but appeals to our most difficult
memories and deepest emotions. We must seek, in our encounters
with others, not just to map the power or read the text, but also to
recognize, in all its alterity, the other's face.

